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Economic Incentives for Global Conservation of Wildlife: 
New International Policy Directions 
 
Abstract 
 
Growing economic globalisation by extending the operation of markets is a two-edged sword 
as far as nature conservation is concerned.  In some circumstances, it threatens the 
conservation of nature and in other cases, it provides economic incentives that foster the 
conservation of biodiversity.  This article shows how global policy directions have altered in 
that regard.  Initially the World Conservation Union (IUCN) favoured bans on trade in 
endangered species.  This view was enshrined in the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES).  Subsequently, with the upsurge of support for market-based 
economic liberalism, IUCN recognised that economic and market incentives, if linked to 
appropriate property rights, could foster biodiversity conservation.  This is reflected in the 
International Convention on Biological Diversity.  While there is conflict between this 
convention and CITES, its extent has been exaggerated.  As explained, in certain cases, trade 
restrictions of the type adopted in CITES are appropriate for nature conservation whereas the 
market-oriented policy of the Convention on Biological Diversity can be effective in some 
different situations.  Whether or not the extension of markets in wildlife and wildlife products 
and growing economic globalisation favours nature conservation varies according to the 
circumstances. 
 
Economic Incentives for Global Conservation of Wildlife: 
New International Policy Directions 
 
1. Introduction 
Growing economic globalisation in recent decades has been associated with growing global 
production (an increasing proportion of which is entering international trade) and with 
expanding levels of foreign direct investment (Tisdell and Sen, 2004).  This economic 
expansion relies on weak conditions for sustainable development rather than strong ones 
which several scholars believe may be necessary if sustainable economic development is to 
be achieved (Tisdell, 1999).  The current pattern of world development may pose a threat to 
the conservation of natural and environmental resources, particularly wildlife and threatens 
the conservation of biodiversity (Tisdell, 2001).  Therefore, some environmentalists are 
concerned about growing economic globalisation as graphically displayed by demonstrations 
associated with the Millennium meeting of WTO in Seattle (Tisdell, 2004). 
However, the views of conservationists about appropriate economic mechanisms for the 
conservation of wildlife have undergone change and opinions are divided.  The dominant 
view amongst conservationists originally was that trade in wildlife or wildlife products, 
especially if extended globally would most likely be unfavourable to their conservation.  This 
view is reflected in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 
which came into force in 1975.  However, a different perspective has now developed that in 
various circumstances, international trade in wildlife or wildlife products could actually 
provide economic incentives for their conservation.  This view is reflected in the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD) which came into force in 1993.  Thus, at least, on the surface, 
there is a potential for serious conflict, between the two international conventions, as for 
example, emphasised by Swanson (1997, Ch.5). 
 
The purpose of this contribution is to examine the nature of this conflict to consider the extent 
to which the two approaches to policy can be reconciled and whether together the constitute 
on adequate approach to conserving global biodiversity.  An additional issue considered is 
why might expanding economic globalisation create a growing problem for conservation of 
wildlife.  However, before going into details, it is worthwhile speculating on why there has 
been an apparent change in policy perspectives between 1975 and 1993, as reflected in the 
different conventions, CITES and CBD. 
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CITES attempts to restrict the operation of market forces to save endangered species whereas 
CBD aims to foster or harness the use of economic incentives and market forces to conserve 
endangered species or ones that are vulnerable to endangerment.  Each assumes, it will be 
argued, a different institutional perspective.  CBD is based on faith in economic incentives 
and market mechanisms when combined with appropriate systems of property rights.  The 
philosophy underlying it reflects the resurgence of support for market-based economic 
liberalism which in itself has been a powerful force for growing economic globalisation. 
 
Let us consider the nature of CITES and the economic rationale behind it, and then the 
evolution and rationale behind the evolution of the sustainable use/economic incentives 
approach as reflected in the CBD.  This will be followed by concluding comments.  These 
provide a general assessment of the current policy situation. 
 
 
2. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES): Its Nature 
and Rationale 
CITES reflected the dominant strand of thinking about policies for conserving wildlife in the 
1960s.  It arose from a draft resolution of the IUCN (World Conservation Union) in 1963 but 
the final version of it was not signed until 1973 and it came into operation in 1975. 
 
In general, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances, CITES bans trade in species of 
flora and fauna listed in Appendix 1.  These are listed on the basis that they are threatened 
with extinction and that this is or may be exacerbated by trade in those species or their 
products.  Trade in species listed in Appendix II is regulated by the issue of export permits.  It 
is believed that species in Appendix II may become endangered globally if trade is not 
regulated by the issue of export permits, but they are not necessarily endangered at present.  
Appendix III species are not necessarily globally endangered but particular countries may be 
concerned that they will become extinct within their borders if their trade in these species is 
unregulated.  The countries concerned regulate international trade in the species and their 
products by the issue of export permits. 
 
Much of the responsibility of implementing CITES is in the hands of each of the countries 
that have acceded to CITES.  Such nations may not always enforce the regulations 
effectively.  This they may do knowingly or because of a lack of resources.  Thus, a large 
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illegal international trade in wildlife an wildlife products has emerged.  Penalties for non-
compliance by nations who have acceded to CITED appear to be absent. 
 
According to CITES regulations, “each country [each signatory to CITES] must designate at 
least one Management Authority entrusted with issuing permits, and at least one Scientific 
Authority entrusted with issuing permits, which advises on scientific matters.  These 
authorities together with inspection and enforcement agencies are responsible for ensuring 
compliance with CITES permit requirements” (Carew-Reid, et al., 2004, p.120). 
 
Swanson (1997, p.96) points out that an Appendix II listing “leaves the decision on trade 
wholly at the discretion of the exporting state”, and, “these permits are allowed to be issued 
so long as the exporting state itself certifies that the export will not be detrimental to the 
survival of the species within the exporting state”.  He points out that the system is open to 
abuse by individual states.  This is a problem but let us consider cases in which at least in 
principle the CITES approach would have merit. 
 
Bans or limitations on trade in commercially valuable wild species can have merit when there 
is open access to the species or if the members of the species are so mobile or fugitive that de 
facto open access to it occurs.  As is well documented in the relevant literature (for example 
see Tisdell, 1991, Ch. 6, 2005, Ch. 6), an expansion, in demand for members of the species, 
or products derived from them can, threaten its existence.  Such an expansion in demand 
could be fostered by growing globalisation, which in effect involves market extension. 
 
The problem is illustrated in Figure 1.  The supply curve of the harvest of an open-access 
species is shown by the backward-bending curve marked SE1E2S.  With restricted markets for 
the harvest, the demand curve for the harvest might be as shown by the line marked D1D1.  
Market equilibrium is then established at E1.  At this level of harvest, the population of the 
species may not be endangered.  However, should demand rise to D2D2, for example, as a 
result of the process of globalisation, the rate of harvest would initially rise and consequently 
reduce the population of the species, increase the per unit cost of the harvest, and could 
endanger continuing existence of the species.  In the case shown, an equilibrium is 
established at E2 after the expansion in demand to D2D2.  However, the population of the 
species may then be so low that it is considered by scientists to be endangered when the 
market equilibrium is established at E2. 
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Figure 1: A diagram to illustrate aspects of CITES regulation of international trade 
to protect endangered or vulnerable wildlife species subject to open-
access 
 
To appreciate the problem, it is important to keep in mind the type of population model of the 
wildlife species that corresponds to the situation illustrated in Figure 1.  This is shown in 
Figure 2.  The curve DFG represents the rate of growth of population of the species.  If 
equilibrium E2 in Figure 1 prevails the rate of harvest of the species is X0 and under 
stationary conditions, this corresponds to an equilibrium of E′2 in Figure 2.  The resulting 
population level of the species is P0. 
4 
 P3 P1P00 
X 
X1
X0
P 
D G 
R0
R1
J′ E′2
A′ H′ 
F 
P4
Level of population of the species 
Rate of 
harvest; rate 
of growth  of 
population 
of the 
species 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the population dynamics of a species underlying Figure 1 
 
Scientists may consider a species to be endangered in equilibrium E2 in Figure 1 (E′2 in 
Figure 2) because there is a risk that the demand curve in Figure 1 will rise above the supply 
curve thereby resulting in extinction of the species.  Or, scientists may consider that there is 
an unacceptable risk of shocks to the population level of a species at E′2 in Figure 2, driving 
its population to a level below D.  If this occurs, the population of the wildlife species is 
unable to recover and it becomes extinct. 
 
Note that a harvest rate of X0 would be more sustainable if the population level of the species 
was allowed to recover to P4 rather than being held at P0.  Furthermore, the cost of the harvest 
of X0 would be lower.  Recovery to P4 could be achieved by initially holding the allowable 
harvest rate at less than X0, and subsequently, increasing it to X0 when a population level of 
P4 is achieved.  The harvest need not be held initially at zero. 
 
However, the policies adopted under CITES have often been ‘stop-go’ policies.  For example, 
total bans on trade in endangered wildlife species are followed by their relaxation when they 
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are more abundant.  This is a human unfriendly approach because it denies for a period of 
time livelihood to those  individuals depending on commercial use of a focal species for their 
income. 
 
Suppose that scientists believe that a minimum population of the focal wildlife species of P1 
is necessary for it not to be endangered.  If initially the market equilibrium is at E2 and the 
population level of the species at P0, recovery to P1 can be achieved by limiting the allowable 
harvest of the species to less than X0.  The speed of convergence to P1 will be faster the lower 
is the initially permitted harvest but the degree of social economic disruption will also be 
greater.  Once P1 is reached the allowable harvest can be raised to X1. 
 
However, a population level of P1 of the species is not ideal from an economic point of view.  
A population level of the species of P3 would be more economic since it will result in a lower 
cost of a harvest of X1, that is, in a per-unit cost of an amount corresponding to H rather than 
A in Figure 1.  This could be achieved by keeping the rate of allowable harvest below X1 
until population recovers to P3.  This may also make the survival of the species more secure 
than if its population level is P3.  However, the policies of CITES do not take account of this 
economic aspect. 
 
Note that market regulation of trade in an open-access commodity tends to encourage the 
development of black markets, and illegal operations.  Regulation of trade in wildlife is not 
an exception. 
 
The economic incentive for black market operations can be illustrated by Figure 1.  Should 
the allowable harvest and trade in the focal wildlife species be restricted to X1 when there is a 
corresponding population level of P1, the gap between the demand price and the supply price 
is equivalent to AB.  This provides scope for bribery and illegal market transactions.  The gap 
is much larger when the level of population of the species is P3 and only a harvest rate of X1 
is allowed.  In Figure 1, this gap is equivalent to the distance HB, and economic incentive for 
illegal market operations are even greater than when the level of population of the species is 
P1. 
 
Whether or not illegal market operations will negate the benefits of market regulation in such 
cases depends on the circumstances.  Factors such as the cost of policing and monitoring 
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compliance would need to be taken into account.  The occurrence of some illegal practices 
does not in itself imply the absence of a net social benefit from market regulation. 
 
In practice, it is not economic to make all wildlife resources private or communal property.  
Thus some wildlife can be expected to remain an open-access resource unless its use is 
regulated by the state.  Market regulation has a role in conserving such resources and in 
ensuring their economical use.  While CITES’ regulations and policies have not addressed the 
issues involved in an ideal manner, there seems little alternative to market regulation as a 
means to conserve commercially valuable open-access species and ensure their economical 
use.  However, a different set of policy approaches are relevant when species can be made, or 
are private property, communal property or even in some cases, state property, and are 
commercially valuable. New approaches to global wildlife policy concentrate on such cases. 
 
3. Market and Economic Incentives for Nature Conservation – New Policy 
Directions as underlined by the Convention on Biological Diversity 
As mentioned above, CITES resulted from a resolution of IUCN passed in 1963.  As time 
passed, however, IUCN began to alter its policy stance.  The World Conservation Strategy 
(IUCN-UNEP-WWF, 1980) was still relatively supportive of the regulated market approach 
but showed growing interest in the use of economic incentives for nature conservation.  In 
particular, it stressed how nature-based tourism in developing countries might provide them 
with economic rewards and incentives for nature conservation.  It was, however, Caring for 
the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living (IUCN-UNEP-WWF, 1991) that marked a 
watershed in IUCN thinking in that it strongly advocated greater use of economic incentives, 
economic mechanisms, and markets as a means to encourage nature conservation.  This 
seems to have partly reflected the position of Martin Holdgate, the then Director-General of 
IUCN and it is claimed to have influenced the outcome from the United Nations Conference 
on Environmental and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the subsequent 
Convention on Biological Diversity ( Adams, 2001, p.70). 
 
Caring for the Earth (IUCN-UNEP-WWF, 1991, p.69) states “Economic policy is also an 
essential instrument for achieving sustainability.  Economic instruments are also valuable 
tools for the establishment of sustainable practices because they provide a strong incentive 
force, while leaving individuals and industries freedom of choice about the precise measures 
they adopt”. 
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It mentions elsewhere (IUCN-UNEP-WWF, 1991, p.42): “Incentives to use natural resources 
sustainably depends on the property rights of users… Exclusivity, duration and other 
characteristics of property rights profoundly influence the incentives of users to conserve 
resources”.  While this is true, it should also be pointed out that property rights (private, 
commercial or state) are not sufficient to ensure the conservation of wildlife species, even 
though they can do so.  For example, if economic returns from cattle grazing are higher than 
from utilisation of wildlife in a land area, there is an economic incentive to convert the area to 
cattle grazing to the likely detriment of some wildlife species present on the land.  
Comparative returns from alternative economic activities on a land area have a major 
influence on whether or not wildlife on that land will be conserved.  In some cases, even 
when landholders can appropriate all the total economic value of wildlife on their land, they 
find that the returns from the utilisation of the wildlife are lower than from other economic 
alternatives.  They then have an incentive to dispense with the wildlife (Tisdell, 2004b).  
However, on other occasions, the ability to appropriate economic returns from wildlife can 
tip the balance in favour of its conservation. 
 
It is probably the latter situation that framers of Caring for the Earth had in mind when they 
stated “Economic return to local communities is important.  Those that successfully conserve 
wildlife stocks should be enabled to export the sustainable surplus and to receive the revenue 
as earned” (IUCN-UNEP-WWF, 1991, p.42). 
 
In any case, the sustainable use; sustainable commercial utilisation theme increasingly 
dominated international thinking about conservation policy in the 1990s and beyond.  
Swanson (1997, p.61) points out that in the 1990s that there was a growing recognition by 
major conservation groups that “resource conservation must be built around the interests of 
the individuals, communities and governments most concerned” and that economic incentives 
are important in international conservation of nature. 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity reflects this outlook.  It emphasises the importance 
of giving property rights to states and ultimately to local communities, individuals and so on 
in genetic resources.  Its main objective, as quoted by Swanson (1997, p.81), is “the 
conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources” (Article 1).  
However, implementing this convention is not as easy as setting out the principles.  For one 
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thing, the establishment and enforcement of property rights is not costless.  Secondly, 
sustainable use of wildlife (especially commercial use) is not always a viable economic 
option for wildlife conservation.  Third, there are conflicts with CITES to be resolved.  As 
pointed out in the previous section, there are some cases, where the best conservation policy 
involves restricting trade in wildlife and wildlife products rather than encouraging their 
marketing.  The need for judgement in this respect complicates policy implementation. 
 
4. Concluding Discussion 
There appears to have been global swings in feelings about appropriate policies for 
conserving wildlife and biodiversity. The most significant change in recent decades has been 
a change from emphasis on international policies to restrict trade in wildlife as a conservation 
measure to one of encouraging trade and establishing property rights in wildlife.  However, a 
blanket approach to global conservation policy is inappropriate for reasons outlined in this 
essay. 
 
The ideal global conservation policy is likely to consist of an array of very different policies – 
some that rely on greater use of market mechanisms to appropriate economic gains from 
wildlife conservation, some that restrict the use of market mechanisms, and some that do not 
use market mechanisms at all.  The latter may include national parks and protected areas from 
which very little of their total economic value can be economically appropriated by the 
landholder.  Such environmental resources may be provided by the state or by NGOs. 
 
The above pattern is not inconsistent with the view that bans on commercial use of wildlife 
can sometimes be detrimental to its conservation.  It is likely, for example, that bans on the 
ivory trade in the 1980s adversely affected those African states that used revenues from this 
trade (eg. South Africa and Zimbabwe) to foster their nature conservation efforts (Swanson, 
1997). 
 
In recent decades, there has been a new flush of excitement about the possibility that greater 
use of market mechanisms can provide spectacular benefits.  There has been a resurgence of 
market-based economic liberalism.  It is associated with growing economic globalisation.  
Social movements for conserving nature and biodiversity have not been immune from the 
influences of the resurgence of market-based economic liberalism, as this essay demonstrates.  
While that may be healthy, there is also a danger of ascribing powers to market mechanism 
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that are unrealistic in some cases.  Even with concerted efforts in market-making, we should 
recognise that some market failures can be expected to continue to exist.  This is particularly 
evident for the conservation of those wildlife species that have high total economic value 
which consists mainly of non-use value.  The latter component is in effect a pure public good 
component that cannot be marketed.  Some wildlife species may also remain de facto open-
access resources because it is too costly to make them private property, or even for the state 
to manage these resources effectively. 
 
While growing globalisation may create greater economic opportunities for higher economic 
benefits from the conservation of wildlife and its commercial utilisation, it heightens the 
degree to which some wildlife species are endangered.  Effective international conservation 
policy involves the difficult task of distinguishing between these situations.  Doing this is a 
complex matter.  There is a need for better appreciation of this complexity in international 
fora and return to a more balanced view about the potential of market and economic 
mechanisms to achieve socially desirable results. 
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